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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

)
(
)

CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L.
(
JOHNSON, his wife; FIRST SECURITY
BANK OF UTAH, N . A . ; IDEAL
).
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

RESPONDENTS' PETITION
FOR REHEARING.
C a s e N o . 14225

Defendant -Respondents.

COME NOW the Respondents above named and respectfully
petition the above entitled Court for a rehearing in the above captioned
matter. This Petition is based upon the following grounds and reason:
1. The Supreme Court has erred in reversing the lower Court's
ruling by wrongfully ignoring the testimony given by Mr. Johnson on
direct examination, after he had qualified a s an opinion w i t n e s s in
accordance with prior decisions of this Court.
This Petition is b a s e d upon and supported by the following
authorities:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff initiated the instant action against the
defendants to acquire by eminent domain their property for road
construction p u r p o s e s . The c a s e w a s tried before a jury with the
Honorable G . Hal Taylor, presiding.

Plaintiff appealed and alleged

error by the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court after
examination of the briefs of the parties and without oral argument.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING

The defendants seek a reversal of this Court's prior ruling
whereby the lower court's judgment w a s reversed and s e e k s to have the
lower court's judgment r e - i n s t a t e d and affirmed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ERRED IN REVERSING THE LOWER
COURT'S RULING BY WRONGFULLY IGNORING THE TESTIMONY
GIVEN BY MR. TOHNSON ON DIRECT EXAMINATION, AFTER HE
HAD QUALIFIED AS AN OPINION WITNESS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

_2_
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The crux of this Petition and for the reversal centers on two
items of testimony given by the landowner at the time of trial. The
primary point of contention by Appellants is the testimony given by
Mr. Johnson on cross-examination as follows: (TR. 56)
"Q. Mr. Johnson, with regard to your estimate of the
value of the property and of the improvements located on the
property, you indicated that your estimate was based on your
life's work. What do you mean by your life's work? Are you
an appraiser, are you a real estate salesman?
A. No, I don't think I am a real estate salesman or
an appraiser.
Q. Do you consider yourself knowledgeable as far
as the valuation or appraisal of the property is concerned?
A . I know what it is worth to me.
Q. And is that what your testimony is based on,
Mr. Johnson, is this what the subject property is worth to you?
A. Yes."
*

The Court, in the majority opinion, singled this testimony out

and based the reversal solely upon this testimony. In doing so the Court
erred by completely ignoring the other voluminous testimony of the witness
which testimony qualifies for admissibility under the prior decisions of
this Court, including Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch,
533 P.2d 888, Ut., April, 1975.

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(See also Salt Lake and U J . P . C o . v s , Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P.
90; State Road Commission v s . Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507;
State Road Commission v s . Sampson, Utah, May 13, 1976); State
Highway Commission of Mont, v s . Peterson, 328 P.2d 617; State of
New Mexico v s . Chavez, 80 N . M . 394, 456 P.2d 868; Provo Water
Users Assn.. v s . Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777).
After establishing the landowner's itimate knowledge of his
property and thus qualifying him, as an opinion witness with extensive
preliminary testimony, Mr. Johnson testified as follows:
H

Q. (By Mr. Wall) Do you, Mr. Johnson, have an
opinion of the fair market value of your property based on the
testimony of all of the matters you have told the Court about
as of March 1, 1974?
A. The full value?
Q. Yes, the entire value of the total package, the
land and total improvements?
A. A hundred twenty to a $125,000.00.
Q. What do you base that on?
A. Well, it is my life's work and it provided me a
good living.
Q. Would you have sold it for anything less than
that?
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A. No."
As mentioned above the witness prefaced his above testimony
with extensive preliminary testimony as revealed by approximately 47
pages of the transcript of record.

(TR. 11-58). Mr. Johnson, 71 years

of age, testified that the property had been built under his direction,
and that he had owned and operated or actively participated in the
operation of the business operated upon said premises for a period of
approximately 20 years.

(TR. 20-24). In addition, it was clearly

established by the evidence and testimony that the property was unique
in that it was the only piece of commercial property in the area, having
predated the zoning ordinance and thus enjoying a "grandfather" zoning
privilege. (TR. 59, 60, 73, 74). As a result of this unique feature
none of the witnesses were able to find "comparable sales" in the
immediate area of the subject property, which fact lends greater
credibility to the personal, first-hand knowledge of the party responsible
for the construction of the building and its operation in the area in
question.
In view of this unique situation we submit that there is no
sound, logical basis upon which such testimony can or should be d i s credited or ignored.
When one reviews the total transcript of the record it should be
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obvious that the testimony of the landowner in the instant case
furnishes a greater degree of probative value of its true market value
than that of the so-called "expert witnesses" who had to rely in large
measure upon "comparable sales" in the areas some distance from the
subject property.
It is worthy to review the statement of this Court in the long
recognized and highly regarded statement of law in the Gase of Salt Lake
and U. R. P. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P.90, at 92, wherein it
is stated:
"If it is shown that the witness is competent to
express an opinion as to values, no matter what the source of
the qualifying information may be, he should be permitted to
testify. The sources of the witnesses' information may vary
according to the peculiar means or opportunity the witness has
of forming an opinion and judging the premises. We do not
think any good reason can be assigned why a person who has
occupied and used the premises all her life, and has been
interested and alert in making inquiry as to its value, may not
be as well qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer, or real
estate man, having more or less to do with the sales and
transfers of real property. The means and extent of the knowledge of any witness may be gone into on cross-examination,
and rebutted by the testimony of other competent witnesses,
whose opinions may differ as to value. No rule can be formulated
for determining the means by which a witness shall acquire the
necessary knowledge to qualify him to speak that will apply in
all c a s e s . If, under all the circumstances, he was in a position
to obtain knowledge and form a correct judgment as to values,
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or using the property
for purposes for which it is adaptable is immaterial, so long as
the jury is given the benefit of the facts upon which the opinion
of the witness is based. (Emphasis added).
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Consistent with the Schramm c a s e , s u p r a . , we believe that
the language set forth in the dissenting opinion in the instant c a s e , of
Justice Maughn merits reiteration and consideration by this Court.
Justice Maughn stated a s follows:
"In the instant action, defendant, Johnson, a s owner
of the property, was qualified to be an opinion w i t n e s s . His
statement concerning his evaluation must be placed within the
context of his other testimony. He had explained the u s e s to
which the property had been devoted and the rental he had
derived therefrom. His statement on cross-examira tion that
his evaluation w a s based on what it w a s worth to him must be
related to all his other testimony. Considered in this light,
his evaluation testimony cannot be deemed of such a nature a s
to be inappropriate proof or incompetent evidence a s to the fact
in i s s u e . "
This argument supports the position of the defendants in that
two concepts presented on direct and cross-examination are not mutually
e x c l u s i v e . The cross and direct testimony must be looked at a s a whole
and the Court cannot ignore the competent and qualified testimony of the
w i t n e s s on direct examination.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the majority opinion has concluded that there was
no s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s in the evidence to sustain the landowners'valuation
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of his property. And in so finding the Court indulges in a fiction of
isolating and focusing on an isolated question and answer illicited in
cross-examination and thus totally disregarding an extensive, direct
and re-direct examination on the issue of damages. In the recent case
of Utah State Road Commission v. Sampson, (Utah, May 13, 1976), the
landowner was permitted to testify concerning the value of his property
which, as in the subject case, he had built, owned and operated for
many years and in that case this Court stated that ". . .

there is a

substantial basis in the evidence to sustain the landowner's valuation
of his property . . . " Although the Sampson case did not involve the
question and answer as illicited in cross-examination in the instant c a s e ,
this Court once again reaffirmed and acknowledged the right of the
property owner to express his opinion of value and did not consider the
same constituted error.
We recognize the existence of authority which holds that it is
improper for a landowner, who is otherwise qualified to express an opinion
on value, to prediate his opinion upon the premise of what the property is
worth to him. However, we believe that the testimony in the instant c a s e ,
when reviewed in its entirety and as a whole, refutes the conclusion that

-8-
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that Mr. Johnson b a s e d his appraisal upon such a b a s i s .

On direct

examination, following extensive background testimony, he rendered an
opinion of value a s set forth in the opinion of this Court. The r e - d i r e c t
examination of Mr. Johnson illicited the following signficant testimony:
" Q . (By Mr. Wall) Mr. Johnson, counsel a s k e d you
if you were an expert, if you understood the concepts of
a p p r a i s i n g . You don't claim to be an expert, real e s t a t e
appraiser, do you?

k

A.

No.

Q.

But you are the property owner; aren't you, or

were?
A. Yes, s i r .
Q . Do you think that over the 71 years you have lived
you have acquired some knowledge of land value in Salt Lake
County?
A. I d o .
Q . Have you dwelled and relied upon that general knowledge and background in formulating your opinion of v a l u e ?
A. That is right. "
We must consider that we are not here dealing with a sophiscated
appraiser, skilled in the use of words of art, but rather a laymen, who in
effect told the trial court and jury, that b a s e d on a total lifetime of
experience (71) years), and an intimate knowledge with the construction, u s e
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and occupancy of the subject property he did, in truth and in fact, have
an opinion of its fair market value. This Court should not be persuaded
to become involved in a technical play on words to defeat and set aside
a jury verdict abundantly supported by competent probative evidence.
In view of the foregoing authorities and argument we respectively
submit that this Court should reverse its prior ruling and reaffirm and
reinstate a Judgment on the Verdict entered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

Brant H. Wall
Attorney for Defendants.
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